76 Oil Wells: Akwa Ibom Must Pull Every Stop to Avoid High Jump -

By Akpandem James

I have a sneaking suspicion that the Revenue Mobilisation and Fiscal Allocation Commission (RMFAC) is not decidedly intent on reallocating the controversial 76 oil wells situated in the continental shelf along the southeastern seaward boundary of the Ekang Estuary to Cross River State. It only seems to be treading on convenient ground, for some reasons.

Though the joint technical evaluation exercise with the Office of the Surveyor-General of the Federation (OSGOF) is structured as response to a petition by an aggrieved party, requesting redress of a perceived wrong, it reminds one of the popular saying that when two brothers fight, the stranger reaps the harvest. And Cross River State does not seem to mind playing the role of the “other woman” in the biblical “Judgment of Solomon” story, involving a dead child.

In retrospect, if former foreign affairs minister of state, Etubom Anthony Ani, and the other political gladiators from Cross River State at the time, who used their closeness to General Sani Abacha to redraw the map of the area, had known their state would eventually be at the agonising end of the gamble, they probably would not have ventured.

Unfortunately, trying now to push the blame for the “hasty” handing over of Bakassi to Cameroon, onto former President Olusegun Obasanjo and Justice Bola Ajibola, as Etubom Ani did in one of his recent write-ups, is just an escapist game. Obasanjo and Ajibola only capitalised on the foundation Ani and others laid to drive their own interests in international politics. Interestingly, all the parties in that escapade lost their respective bids; but Etubom Ani, who was also the finance minister in the Abacha era, and his co-travelers now seem like the most painful losers.

Historical context matters in unraveling what has put these two brother states on tenterhooks. It started as a game for political relevance, with politicians and technocrats flexing their muscles to demonstrate their clout in the national governance space. The two states were one, Cross River State, until 1987. There were no glaring issues regarding ownership of the settlements in the Bakassi Peninsula, particularly the Abana Ntuen and Atabong communities. These were ab-initio fishing settlements (Ine), used as stopover points by local deep-sea fishermen on the way to their final destinations. If anything, ownership contention was between Nigeria and Cameroon. This was not limited to Abana and Atabong; it included Akpa Nkanya, Ine Ekoi, Ine Akpak, and other smaller strips on the peninsula.

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During the Nigerian Civil War, General Yakubu Gowon, the Head of State, on May 27, 1967, divided Nigeria into 12 states. South Eastern State (later rechristened Cross River State) was one of them, comprising today’s Akwa Ibom and Cross River States. The original map of Eastern Nigeria placed Atabong, Abana (including James Town), and Efiat under Oron Province, now in Akwa Ibom State. Akwa Ibom was created on September 23, 1987, by the Ibrahim Babangida administration, without altering the old province boundaries. That followed the failure of the Senator Victor Akan-led group in their bid for a Calabar State,

Before then, some prominent elders, including Etubom Andem Asuquo, a member of the Obong’s Council in Calabar, from Adiabo (Mbiabo Usuk) in Cross River today, claimed ancestral heritage in Atabong, James Town and the estuaries. There is campaign poster evidence that Etubom Asuquo contested elections to represent Mbo in the Oron State Constituency under the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) during the Second Republic. Mbo is in today’s Akwa Ibom State. So, ancestral relations existed and were well nurtured. Contention only began after the creation of Akwa Ibom State and the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities in the Bakassi area.

As Nigeria grew more interested in the peninsula, obviously due to the massive oil discovery, Cameroon put up a challenge. While Nigeria intensified efforts to appropriate the space, political gladiators from Cross River and Akwa Ibom, anticipating derivation benefits, began a tug-of-war over ownership. When the saga hit international limelight, it signaled a red flag, a build-up to an own goal, as Cameroon had already established significant presence in the contested area. To discerning observers, the outcome was predictable: it would be hard to claim settlements where Nigerian fishermen paid taxes to Cameroon, where Cameroon had built schools and health centres, and where Nigerian businesses operated under Cameroon-appointed warrant chiefs from districts like Kombo Abedimo and Idabato.

With the scenario growing more enticing, moves began in the direction of annexing the oil-rich section to Cross River. Prominent politicians with roots in both states leveraged their military junta connections and secured Bakassi as a distinct local government area for Cross River State in December 1996. Following the hurried packaging of Bakassi as an LGA, apparently done in spite of Akwa Ibom State, a son was crowned Paramount Ruler of the new LGA, even as his biological father was at the time a village head in neighboring Akpabuyo LGA, created earlier in 1991.

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When Nigeria lost the ownership bid at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague in 2002, followed by the Green Tree Agreement of June 12, 2006, which formally ceded the peninsula to Cameroon, a new vista opened, escalating contention between the two states. Cross River, having lost its littoral status following the ICJ ruling, also forfeited rights to oil wells on the eastern seaward boundary along Nigeria’s territorial waters. Akwa Ibom became the beneficiary. In this case, 76 oil wells were affected.

Cross River challenged the loss in court. On July 10, 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed an earlier position that, as far as the ICJ ruling was concerned, Cross River lacked locus standi as a non-littoral state. Without a maritime boundary, coastline contiguous to the open sea and extending to the 200-meter isobath, Cross River had no legal grounds over offshore oil resources. That was the ruling! Notwithstanding, disputes persisted. Successive Cross River State governors tried and failed to redeem the situation.

Governor Bassey Otu now believes he might get lucky with another gambit. He has thrown his hat in the ring, threatening Akwa Ibom’s revenue basket. Since Governor Otu’s renewed challenge, the two states have not slept easily, especially with RMFAC and OSGOF brought into the fray. Should Akwa Ibom lose sleep, with the Supreme Court judgment in its favour? Ordinarily, it shouldn’t! But staying nice amid a looming threat, especially in Nigeria’s landscape, could prove monumentally disastrous. Protecting what is in the kitty is by far better than salvaging it after losing it, even if momentarily, no matter your strength. Akwa Ibom must pull every stop to avoid a high jump.

Cross River plays on technicalities this time, that the Supreme Court was not specific about the ownership of the disputed wells. The new lines are: the court made no direct order transferring, awarding or relocating the wells to Akwa Ibom; Cross River’s appeal at the Supreme Court was never dismissed, it was only struck out. It has remained unyielding. Having failed at the courts, the state has turned to the OSGOF and RMFAC. It claims the Supreme Court left a leeway for these agencies to assign wells to the offshore boundary where they are physically located, through technical determination.

ALSO READ Salient historical mistakes some Igbo leaders made By Prof Lawrence ETIM Discussions about Nigerian history, particularly the events leading to the Civil War and the continuing agitation for self-determination, often evoke strong emotions and divergent interpretations. While many people focus on external factors that affected the Igbo people, it is equally important to examine certain decisions and actions by prominent Igbo leaders that some critics regard as STRATEGIC ERRORS or POLITICAL MISTAKES. Whether one agrees with these assessments or not, they remain part of the broader historical debate. 1. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's Rejection of the Right to Secession Before Nigeria attained independence, Chief Obafemi Awolowo reportedly supported constitutional provisions that would allow any region to withdraw from the federation if it so desired. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, however, opposed such provisions, favouring a stronger and more indivisible Nigerian federation. As a consequence, the Nigerian Constitution evolved without a recognised legal pathway for secession, making any attempt at breaking away from the federation constitutionally impermissible. Critics argue that this position reflected a lack of foresight, particularly in light of later political crises. Interestingly, many of those who advocate self-determination today, notably the Igbos, rarely attribute any responsibility to Azikiwe for supporting a constitutional framework that effectively foreclosed the option of lawful secession. Canada has a constitutional provision that guarantees the right of any region to break away through a plebescite. In 1992, a French speaking region Quebec narrowly missed the threshold score in a referendum that would have allowed it to break away. Ethiopia, former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, St Kitts and Nevis are other examples of countries that provide constitutional rights for any of its region to break away. Critics say Nigeria missed such opportunity because of Zik's opposition during the pre-indepedence constitutional conference and public debate. 2. The January 1966 Coup and Its Perceived Ethnic Imbalance The January 15, 1966 military coup, led principally by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, remains one of the most controversial events in Nigerian history. During the coup, several prominent Northern political leaders and senior military officers were killed, while leading Igbo military officers and politicians were spared. Ojukwu himself was living in Kano but was spared. Madiebo (who would later serve as the chief of defence staff in Biafra) and many other military officers of Igbo extraction were also spared. This apparent imbalance created widespread perceptions in Northern Nigeria that the coup was ethnically motivated, regardless of the intentions of its planners. The resulting suspicion and resentment contributed significantly to the counter-coup of July 1966. Critics contend that Nzeogwu's actions unintentionally deepened ethnic divisions and destabilised the country. They further argue that many Igbo commentators have been reluctant to subject Nzeogwu's actions to the same level of criticism directed at other historical actors. 3. The taking over of power by Aguiyi-Ironsi was uncalled for. J. T. U Aguiyi-Ironsi had no business taking over power when the president, speaker of Parliament and chief Justice of the Federation where there. These were the people (in that order) stipulated by the Constitution to take over power in the event of the absence of the Prime minister. So, it was mistaken for Ironsi to take over the reigns of power. According to critics, that action also portrayed Ironsi as being sympathetic to the coup plotters. No Igbo person has ever openly criticized Ironsi for that malfeasance. 4. General Ironsi's Failure to Swiftly Prosecute the Coup Plotters Following the January 1966 coup, Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi assumed power as Nigeria's Head of State. During his six-month administration, the principal coup plotters were not prosecuted or subjected to any judicial proceedings. To many Northern officers and political leaders, this appeared to validate suspicions that the new government was sympathetic to the coup's objectives. Whether justified or not, these perceptions further eroded trust in the federal government and intensified regional tensions. Critics therefore argue that Ironsi missed an important opportunity to reassure the country and restore confidence in national institutions. The Igbos have never blamed ironsi for such inertia. 5. The Introduction of a Unitary System of Government by Ironsi One of the most consequential decisions of the Ironsi administration was the promulgation of Decree No. 1, which sought to replace Nigeria's federal structure with a unitary system of government. By concentrating greater authority at the centre and reducing regional autonomy, the decree generated widespread opposition, particularly in Northern Nigeria. Critics maintain that the policy was politically ill-timed and insufficiently sensitive to Nigeria's ethnic and regional diversity. They also argue that it made any future attempt at regional self-determination more difficult by strengthening the authority of the central government. I'm not aware of any Igbo person clamouring for cessation today who had ever blamed Ironsi for promulgating such a retrogressive law, whose reverberations are still felt upto this moment. 6. Ojukwu and the Decision to Go to War History offers numerous examples of leaders who have faced scrutiny for taking their nations into unsuccessful wars. Critics often cite the example of General Leopoldo Galtieri the military president of Argentina, whose decision to engage the United Kingdom in the 1982 Falklands War led to military defeat and subsequent legal consequences. After the war, Argentina prosecuted Galtieri in a court of law and jailed him for 12 years for losing the war and bringing opprobrium to the country. Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu led the Eastern Region into the Nigerian Civil War following his declaration of the Republic of Biafra in 1967. With huge propaganda machinery but little arms and ammunitions, Ojukwu dragged his people and other Easterners into a three-year period of mass suffering and death. The war ended in Biafra's defeat with immense human suffering, humongous loss of life, and severe economic devastation. Critics argue that Ojukwu should have taken responsibility for the consequences of the conflict. They further contend that many Igbo people continue to celebrate his legacy while paying comparatively little attention to his strategic errors that contributed to the catastrophic outcome. Had Ojukwu been prosecuted or even criticized for losing the war, younger generations of IPOB leaders would have been more circumspect with a lesson to learn. President Obasanjo should always be appreciated for not dragging Nigeria into a senseless war with Cameroon over Bakasi Peninsula. History will for ever remember President Jonathan for knowing that his political ambition is not worth the blood of any Nigerian. 7. Nnamdi Kanu and Contemporary Separatist Agitation In contemporary times, Nnamdi Kanu emerged as the leading figure of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), advocating the creation of an independent Biafran state. His movement has generated both support and controversy. Critics argue that aspects of the agitation, including the enforcement of Monday sit-at-home orders by various actors claiming allegiance to the cause, have inflicted substantial economic losses on businesses and communities in the South-East. They further contend that violence associated with separatist activities has disproportionately affected the very communities the movement seeks to protect. From this perspective, Kanu's leadership deserves critical scrutiny alongside criticism directed at other political actors in Nigerian history. Sadly, no Igbo person has ever openly criticized Kanu. 8. Important Igbo political leaders do not support Peter Obi presidency. Is it a big mistake that many important Igbo political leaders do not support Obi's presidential bid? For instance, the governor of Anambra State Chukwuma Charles Soludo is in the wont of declaring his anti-Obi sentiments openly, declaiming that Obi will never win. The Minister of Works Engr David Umahi does not support Obi either. Obi's public campaigns are essentially plebs-driven. Critics are wondering why Igbos do not criticize their leaders for not supporting Obi. A mature assessment of history requires the willingness to examine both external injustices and internal mistakes. No ethnic group, political movement, or historical figure is beyond criticism. Understanding the successes and failures of past leaders can provide valuable lessons for future generations and contribute to more balanced and constructive discussions about Nigeria's past, present, and future.

From the look of things, it seems that the Cross River government exerted considerable pressure on these agencies to conduct a technical evaluation of the coordinates, as it insists that there has never been any coordinate-based mapping, seabed analysis or boundary overlay that has established factual entitlement on the matter. The state claims to have comprehensive geological, hydrographic, maritime and legal evidence of the disputed area covering as far as the body of water in the estuary from the west point median line to the east point at the Akwayafe Estuary opening. The report containing the said evidence underpinned its petition to the President, prompting the Inter-Agency Committee’s scientific and geological geolocation exercise.

While Cross River insists the issue remains open to reassessment based on scientific, geological and maritime evidence, Akwa Ibom must intently scrutinise the Supreme Court ruling’s letters and purport, mindful of the issues raised in Cross River State’s technical report. The battle for the oil wells has been grueling, and Akwa Ibom State has been fierce in defence; but now it must go beyond the Supreme Court ruling and historical advantage. Nothing should be taken for granted. It is time for serious interrogation and strategic positioning. Governor Umo Eno of Akwa Ibom State and his team must leverage every advantage to retain the wells. Losing them would ruin the state’s economy and limit the people’s prosperity. The spectre of loss is nightmarish; refunding arrears of what has already been collected will be catastrophic.